Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill Hello friend AMERICAN WORKERS LOOKING FOR JOBS, In the article you read this time with the title Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill, we have prepared this article well for you to read and take information in it. hopefully the contents of the post Article bank, Article contracting, Article health, Article lecturer, Article manufacturing, Article marketing, Article property, Article public, Article teachers, Article telecommunications,what we write can you understand. okay, happy reading.

Judul : Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill
link : Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill

Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill

How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money:  Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair
Martin Bichler, Alexander Hammerl, Stefan Waldherr,  Thayer Morrill
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, forthcoming.

Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available, and thus can provide a powerful design principle for information systems. Unfortunately, it is well-known that it is impossible to combine all three properties of truthfulness, efficiency, and fairness (i.e. envy-freeness) in matching with preferences. Established mechanisms are either efficient or envy-free, and the efficiency loss in envy-free mechanisms is substantial. We focus on a widespread representative of a matching problem: course assignment where students have preferences for courses and organizers have priorities over students. An important feature in course assignment is that a course has both a maximum capacity and a minimum required quota. This is also a requirement in many other matching applications such as school choice, hospital-residents matching, or the assignment of workers to jobs. We introduce RESPCT, a mechanism that respects minimum quotas and is truthful, efficient, and has
low levels of envy. The reduction in envy is significant and is due to two remarkably effective heuristics. We follow a design science approach and provide analytical and experimental results based on field data from a large-scale course assignment application. These results have led to a policy change and the proposed assignment system is now being used to match hundreds of students every semester.

Such is the article Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill

That's an article Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill this time, hopefully it can benefit you all. well, see you in other article postings.

You are now reading the article Course allocation with minimum quotas, by Bichler, Hammerl, Waldherr, and Morrill with the link address https://americanworkerslooking.blogspot.com/2020/06/course-allocation-with-minimum-quotas.html

Tweet

Subscribe to receive free email updates: