Large cores in college admissions markets: the case of Hungary by Biro, Hassidim, Romm, Shorrer and Sovago Hello friend AMERICAN WORKERS LOOKING FOR JOBS, In the article you read this time with the title Large cores in college admissions markets: the case of Hungary by Biro, Hassidim, Romm, Shorrer and Sovago, we have prepared this article well for you to read and take information in it. hopefully the contents of the post Article bank, Article contracting, Article health, Article lecturer, Article manufacturing, Article marketing, Article property, Article public, Article teachers, Article telecommunications,what we write can you understand. okay, happy reading.

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Large cores in college admissions markets: the case of Hungary by Biro, Hassidim, Romm, Shorrer and Sovago

 Here's a paper that tells us something about stable college admissions, and also something more general about large cores in matching with contracts.

Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets*

by Péter Biró, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer, Sándor Sóvágó

Abstract: This paper studies the set of stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The stable deferred acceptance mechanism implicitly allocates funding based on merit. In Hungary, where the centralized mechanism is based on deferred acceptance, an alternate stable algorithm would change the assignment of 9.3 percent of the applicants, and increase the number of assigned applicants by 2 percent. Low socioeconomic status applicants and colleges in the periphery benefit disproportionately from moving to this non-merit-based algorithm. These findings stand in sharp contrast to findings from the matching (without contracts) literature.

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